Supreme Court Upholds Stalking Conviction, Clarifies Right to Counsel Rules in Guilty Plea Case
A domestic violence and stalking case that ended in a 162-month prison sentence recently made its way to the Washington State Supreme Court, asking justices to answer complex questions about a defendant’s constitutional right to an attorney and the rules for withdrawing a guilty plea.
The case centers on the trial of Kristopher Korsakas, but the dispute extends far beyond one defendant.
It raises legal questions about what constitutes a “complete denial” of legal counsel during a critical stage of a prosecution—and whether a lawyer merely being physically present in the courtroom is enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.
The Origins of the Legal Battle
The conflict, detailed in an en banc Supreme Court opinion published on May 21, stems from Korsakas’ trial.
According to court records, the State charged Korsakas with multiple violations of domestic violence protection orders, domestic violence stalking, first-degree criminal impersonation, and misdemeanor stalking.
Near the end of the prosecution’s case, after the jury had heard testimony from multiple victims detailing a “three-part plan” of possessive behavior, threats, and electronic surveillance, Korsakas abruptly waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty.
The trial judge accepted the guilty plea, finding it knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
The Right to Counsel Hurdle
During his sentencing hearing, Korsakas changed his mind and sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
The proceedings hit a significant legal hurdle involving Korsakas’ defense attorney.
When Korsakas indicated he wanted to withdraw his plea, his court-appointed attorney declined to file a written motion or argue on his behalf.
Instead, the attorney asked the judge, “Can I let Mr. Korsakas make his motion, Your Honor? It’s collateral attack. I don’t normally get involved with that.”
The Supreme Court noted the attorney was legally incorrect—a motion to withdraw a plea before a judgment is entered is explicitly not a collateral attack.
Despite this, the sentencing judge allowed Korsakas to present the motion himself. Acting without his attorney’s help, Korsakas argued his trial counsel had been so ineffective that he had no choice but to take a guilty plea.
The judge denied the motion, finding it failed to meet the standard of a “manifest injustice,” and sentenced him to an exceptional 162 months in prison.
The Dissenting View
The case was appealed to the state’s highest court, where Korsakas argued that being required to address the court directly constituted a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of his prosecution.
In a sharp dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Justice G. Helen Whitener argued that Korsakas’ constitutional rights were undeniably violated.
Justice Whitener highlighted that the trial judge forced Korsakas to proceed without the assistance of counsel without first advising him of the dangers of self-representation or ensuring he was voluntarily waiving his right to an attorney.
“It is true that Korsakas’ counsel was physically present,” Justice Whitener wrote. “But the majority fails to explain how this satisfied Korsakas’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel when... Korsakas’ assigned counsel failed to assist him with the motion.”
The Court’s Ruling
Despite this stark constitutional warning, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled against Korsakas, upholding his conviction and his sentence.
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Steven C. González, the justices concluded that while a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is indeed a critical stage of the prosecution, Korsakas was not completely denied counsel.
The key factor? Physical presence and continued representation.
Justice González wrote that Korsakas’ attorney remained appointed and available in the courtroom throughout the hearing and did not face an actual conflict of interest.
Because the attorney did not abandon his client, remain totally absent, or concede guilt over his client’s objection, the high threshold for a complete denial of counsel was not met.
While the ruling leaves Korsakas’ conviction intact, it serves as a strict boundary for Washington courts: an attorney’s refusal to argue a specific motion does not automatically equal the total deprivation of legal counsel.